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“Great Laws, Bad Implementation” — Criminal Justice 
Reform in Russia since the Fall of the Soviet Union 
Taryn Strohmeyer 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 “We have a completely new code – the best in the world, but with the worst 
implementation.” This is the way eminent criminal defense attorney Murad Musaev 
of the law firm Musaev & Partners in Moscow described the situation in Russia 
since the implementation of post-Soviet reforms to the criminal justice system. This 
was not the first or the last time I would hear about this notion of the Russian 
criminal justice during my trip to Russia with The University of Chicago Law 
School International Immersion Program, during which a group of eleven 
University of Chicago Law students and myself travelled to Moscow and St. 
Petersburg,  learning over the course of ten days about the legal regime, political 
landscape, history, and culture of Russia through coordinated meetings, talks, 
lunches, dinners, and events with lawyers, UChicago alums, professors, and 
advocates.  
Over and over again, my classmates and I heard the same notion regarding 
Russia’s post-Soviet transition, which began in the early 90s with a new 
constitution and led to the adoption of a new criminal code. The students, lawyers, 
and scholars we met in both Moscow and St. Petersburg all seemed to echo the same 
belief that Russia has “great laws” but simply suffers from “bad implementation.” 
This paper will investigate this claim, analyzing what is meant by the idea that 
Russia has “great laws, bad implementation,” laying out some of the issues with the 
Russian criminal justice transition and considering a few of the factors that might 
cause this impression or phenomenon.  
 In the first section, this paper will provide general background on Russia’s 
transition from communism to democracy, including the adoption of a new 
constitution and implementation of a new criminal code. The second section of this 
paper will describe the problems and failings of the Russian criminal justice system 
that lead scholars and lawyers to decry the code’s “bad implementation.” Then 
finally, the third section outlines some of the potential contributing factors and 
causes of the problems described in section two.  
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF POST-SOVIET TRANSITION IN RUSSIA 
 The problems of criminal justice reform in Russia today are a product of the 
overall transition from communism to democracy in Russia after the fall of the 
Soviet era. This section will briefly outline the events that led to the fall of the 
Soviet Union, the transition to a democratic regime, and the efforts to reform the 
criminal justice system in the new Russia. This section will also provide brief 
insight into the criminal justice system before and after the fall, and some of the 
difficulties faced in implementing criminal justice reform – both of which will be 
touched on in greater detail at other points in this paper.   
a. Historical Foundations 
 Mikhail Gorbachev was the last leader of the Russian Communist regime. 
His reign, which was marked by a series of democratizing reforms, ultimately 
resulted in severe economic crisis and an accompanying widespread dissatisfaction 
that ushered in the ultimate collapse of the Soviet era.  
The Gorbachev years severely weakened the communist regime. During his 
time in power Gorbachev implemented the concepts of “glasnost” (openness) and 
“perestroika” (reconstruction of the Communist regime).1 These essentially 
capitalistic and democratic reforms included implementing elections with a multi-
party system, establishing a presidency for the Soviet Union, and loosening overall 
the central controls of the Soviet Union over the countries of Eastern Europe.2  
Gorbachev believed that his reforms would revitalize the Communist regime and 
lead it to triumph in Europe; however, they instead caused great instability and an 
extreme economic crisis that turned the population against him.3 Furthermore, 
these reforms began a “slow process of democratization” that led to the fall of the 
Berlin wall, worked to destabilized Communist control, and ultimately set the stage 
for the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.4  
On December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned his post and the Soviet Union 
finally fell, leaving Boris Yeltsin as the president of the new Russia.5 Upon the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the former monolith broke apart into twelve 
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independent republics: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan.6 
Yeltsin was ultimately able to reorganize several of the republics into what is today 
the Russian Federation, a single state composed of the remaining republics left 
after the fall of the Soviet Union; but, this marked the beginning of a rapid period of 
transition for the new Russia that was both economic and political.7  
b. Transition to Democracy 
The 1970s had marked the beginning of a long downward trend in economic 
power for the Soviet regime, which reached crescendo in the final years of the 
USSR.8 In 1989 and 1990 the USSR suffered from severe declines in outputs, 
extreme shortages, horrendous living conditions, and overall fear of an impending 
collapse.9 After the collapse, Yeltsin began an extensive program of radical 
democratizing reforms.10 “The program laid out a number of macroeconomic policy 
measures to achieve stabilization. It called for sharp reductions in government 
spending, targeting outlays for public investment projects, defense, and producer 
and consumer subsidies. The program aimed at reducing the government budget 
deficit, imposing new taxes and controlling inflation. Crucially, the reformers 
planned to liberalize trade and make the ruble convertible, thus opening up 
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Russia’s economy to the world.”11 Furthermore, almost overnight the communist 
regime of the Soviet Union transformed into a multiparty democracy with regular 
elections and a capitalist economy based on markets, free enterprise and private 
property.12 
With the fall of the Soviet Union, the new Russia also had to undertake the 
tremendous task of establishing a new legal regime. This involved adopting a new 
constitution and implementing a new criminal code. On December 12, 1993, the new 
Russia adopted by referendum its new constitution.13  While the new constitution 
still gave considerable power to the president and included restrictions on the 
sovereignty of regions within the Russian Federation, it guaranteed “a spectrum of 
rights: freedom of conscience, freedom of movement, freedom of the press, the right 
to private property and the right to own land, which the previous document 
restricted.”14 
Then in 1997, attempts to overhaul the criminal code were finally successful 
when the new code was passed in the Duma.15 However, the changes were not 
officially made into law until current Russian president Vladimir Putin pushed the 
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code through in 2001.16 The new criminal code includes over 3,500 amendments, but 
is still based on the old Soviet code, which limits the rights of the accused and 
provides no right to a jury trial.17 “An estimated 150,000 criminal cases were 
expected to require review based on the new code” to determine if the prisoners in 
such cases should be released because the laws under which they were convicted no 
longer exist.18  For both the new constitution and criminal code, the new Russia 
looked to Western Europe and the United States as models.19  
c. Criminal Justice Reform 
 Under the Soviet era, the criminal code served to protect the interests of the 
state and keep the masses under control.20 Judges served five year terms, were 
subordinated to the Communist Party, and generally carried out the wishes of the 
government lest they face removal.21 The laws, which were notoriously ambiguous, 
were easily mutable depending on the whims and desires of the authorities 
enforcing them.22 Those charged with crimes had little protection– there were no 
jury trials, defense attorneys were not taken seriously by the court, and judges also 
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served as prosecutors on their cases.23 Accordingly, those charged with crimes were 
almost always convicted, and had little hope of overturning their sentence.24  
The new code, which was implemented in 2001, is a combination of European 
continental civil law and Soviet law.25 While Soviet law retained a prominent role in 
the new system, reform efforts sought to model the new code after Western Europe 
and the United States.26 This involved three primary reforms. First, the new 
criminal justice system aimed to increase the independence of the judiciary.27 
Second, the new regime sought to limit the influence of the Russian Procurary, the 
administrative agency responsible for criminal investigations (hereinafter “the 
Prosecution”).28 Finally, amendments to the new criminal code were designed to 
change the Russian criminal justice system from an inquisitorial system to an 
adversarial system.29    
 Together these reforms attempted to address the inadequacies and failings of 
the Soviet era criminal justice system. The reforms were expansive and pervasive, 
however, upon implementation, as the Sections II and III will explain in greater 
detail, many reform efforts fell short. These failures are presumably what led to the 
“great laws, bad implementation” phenomenon, which Russian legal scholars of all 
                                                 
23 MIRANDA LATHROP BARBER, “REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN RUSSIA: PROGRESS 
REPORT FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY,” 13 Transnat’l Law 319, 321 (2000).   
24 Id. 
25 KRASNOKUTSKI, supra note 1, at 55. 
26 SOLOMON, supra note 15, at 163. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
types seem to agree characterizes the criminal justice system in Russia since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  
II. BAD IMPLEMENTATION 
 This section investigates what “bad implementation” really looks like in 
modern Russia and outlines some of the primary ways in which Russia’s so-called 
“great laws” fail to be implemented. While the Moscow criminal defense attorney, 
who uttered our here-paradigmatic phrase “great laws, bad implementation,” 
seemed to downplay the severity of the problems with the modern Russian criminal 
justice regime– dispassionately commenting: “our implementation is just bad”– 
research reveals a system plagued by many of the same problems and injustices 
faced during the Soviet regime.30   It would seem that despite “great laws,” “Russia 
is still a country where suspects can be detained indefinitely, where arbitrary, 
politically and even economically motivated prosecutions are common, where 
coercion of suspects is rampant, where the police can stop anyone on the street 
without any reasonable cause.”31 
a. General 
“Constitutional change becomes meaningless … unless it is accomplished by 
constitutionalist procedure, which, in the practical sense, means generalized assent 
on the part of most if not all citizens.”32 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
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the new Russian Federation overhauled its criminal code, implementing a new 
system that was supposed to entitle defendants to professional representation, 
prohibit torture, ensure the independence of the judiciary, limit unnecessary or 
unlawful detentions, and ensure a speedy, fair trial.33 However, actual practice has 
deviated from the ideals envisioned by these reform efforts, and led many to 
question the legitimacy of the whole system. In the words of Mark Feigin, one of the 
defense lawyers for anti-Putin protesters Pussy Riot, “it’s very simple—there is no 
justice in Russia. The decisions taken by courts bear no relation to what is actually 
written down in the laws of the land.”34  
b. Timely Justice 
 Criminal justice reform in post-Soviet Russia included several provisions 
devised to ensure timely execution of justice. However, lengthy pretrial detentions 
and prosecutorial delays remain a widespread problem in Russia.35 Some delays are 
pernicious, while others are simply products of large case backlogs, lack of 
discipline, and in some cases negligence or incompetence.36  
While the Russian Constitution now prohibits detention for over forty-eight 
hours “except where authorized by judicial decision,” arbitrary, excessive, and 
illegal detention is still widely practiced in Russia today.37 Furthermore, the 
Russian Criminal Procedure Code “sets a two-month time limit on the period 
                                                 
33 KRASNOKUTSKI, supra note 1, at 15. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
between the opening of the investigation and the time that a file is transferred to 
the [Prosecution] to initiate formal court charges.”38 However, the Prosecution has 
the discretion to extend this period up to eighteen months without any explanation 
to detainees.39 This is made worse by the fact that bail is very infrequently offered 
in Russia, regardless of flight risk or type of crime.40 Furthermore, it is not 
uncommon for Prosecution to arbitrarily extend this period for the purpose of 
extorting money from friends and family of detainees.41  
The Prosecution is also notorious for creating delays due to negligence and 
incompetence in handling caseloads. For example, the Prosecution has a well-
documented tendency to delay submitting necessary paperwork to the court.42 One 
study found that the Prosecution only submitted paperwork within the statutory 
time limits in one-third of cases.43 The situation is so dire in some cases that some 
suspects “spend as much time in pretrial detention as they would if found guilty of 
the crime charged.”44 
c. Fair Trial 
 Another main focus of the post-Soviet reforms was implementing measures 
aimed at ensuring a fair trial. This involved measures to increase the independence 
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of the judiciary, limit arbitrary arrests, and afford suspects with competent legal 
defense. However, this has not played out upon implementation. 
 Judicial independence and objectivity remains a serious problem in the 
current regime.45 Many judges still remain allegiant to the Party, and susceptible to 
its influences, despite being technically granted lifetime appointment under the 
new regime.46 Many of Russia’s judges retained their positions from the Soviet 
system and old habits die hard; and those who were newly appointed or simply do 
not feel such lingering allegiances are still limited by “tight financial ties to the 
political authorities.”47 Additionally, judges in Russia still often serve the dual role 
of judge and prosecutor, which limits their ability to serve as an objective arbiter of 
justice.48 Judges tend to take on this double duty when the Prosecution does not 
appear, which occurs in approximately 60 percent of cases according to one study.49  
In such cases, the judge interrogates witnesses, presents evidence against the 
defendant, and makes the final determination of guilt.50  
 Under the new regime, the role of defense counsel is also quite limited. First, 
legal defense, while technically guaranteed by law, is often too expensive or too 
limited in supply to be available to defendants.51 Second, the inquisitorial system in 
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place in Russia limits the role of defense counsel in presenting cases.52 Third, and 
most strikingly, more than 99 percent of all criminal defendants in Russia are found 
guilty.53 This means that defense counsel’s role is limited to mitigating sentencing 
decisions since conviction is almost a foregone conclusion upon arrest.54   
III. EXPLAINING THE PHENOMENON 
“From a legal standpoint, Russia has achieved a democratic system dedicated 
to protecting the rights of the individual. [However], [s]everal questions remain: 
why does the Russian system fall so miserably in practice and how does an 
ostensibly democratic society in the twenty-first century allow it to fail?”55 This 
section considers these questions and presents a few factors that contribute to the 
failures in implementation, which plague the Russian criminal justice reform 
efforts.  
a. Persisting Politicization 
Political concerns play a big part in legal decisions today in Russia in that 
law enforcement and the judiciary seek to implement outcomes that satisfy the 
whims of governing parties. According to an article in the Washington Post about 
the Russian criminal justice system, “rules are words to dance around and laws 
mean what the authorities say they mean.”56  Accordingly, one factor, to which the 
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phenomenon of bad implementation in the criminal justice system in Russia can 
largely be attributed, is distorting political motivations and influences. 
 As point of illustration, take the extraordinary low acquittal rate. In Russia, 
there is a popular belief that acquittals are a defect of the criminal justice system.57 
Too many of these “defects” makes the system appear flawed, and by proxy, makes 
the government look weak and ineffective.58 As a result of this belief, judges are 
evaluated on the “stability of their sentences,” or in other words, on their acquittal 
rates, and judges who grant too many acquittals risk being removed for poor 
performance.59  
This highlights another problem.  While post-Soviet reform efforts attempted 
to increase the independence of the judiciary, the judiciary largely remains an agent 
of the state, rather than the people.60 Today, judges in Russia are “career officials 
whose continuation in office and promotion depend upon the good will of the 
chairmen of their courts.”61 Judges, who grant too many acquittals, attempt creative 
or innovative judicial interpretations, or insist on upholding laws to the detriment 
of the Prosecution’s case, risk displeasing the chairman, and face the prospect of 
being removed from their position.62 This risk of removal seriously impedes the 
objective implementation and execution of laws in Russia because judges have their 
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own professional fates in mind when determining the legal fates of defendants in 
their courtrooms.  
 More straight forward political influences also take the form of exemptions 
and exceptions for friends and colleagues of the political elite. President Vladimir 
Putin is well known for exempting government officials and wealthy businessmen 
from prosecution.63 Furthermore, Russian police often effectuate arrests 
inconsistently depending on the person involved.64  
Ultimately, the State today, like in the Soviet era, remains very much 
involved in the implementation of criminal justice in Russia. The result is a biased 
and distorted process, which bends to the whims of the political elite and serves the 
interests of the state and judiciary over the individual.  
b. Attitude 
 Another potential explanation for, or contributing factor to the phenomenon 
of bad implementation in the post-Soviet regime, could be the attitude with which 
post-Soviet reforms have been, and are treated in Russia. The transition from the 
Soviet code to the current criminal code involved a massive overhaul with 
thousands of amendments, which took great effort and time to be passed into law.65 
While it is understandable that such massive transition takes time to fully 
effectuate and perfect, judicial reform has moved slowly and many attempted 
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reforms, such as jury trials, have been rolled back after unsuccessful trial runs.66 
This failure in implementation reflects the pervasive attitude in Russia that the 
new laws are “ideals to aspire to” rather than mandatory standards.67 This attitude 
can be seen in many forms throughout the criminal justice system in Russia, 
including the undisciplined implementation of pre-trial detainment time limits, the 
continued removability of judges, and rampant arbitrary arrests, and likely 
explains why Russia’s allegedly “great” new laws are so poorly implemented.68  
b. Bad Laws 
 Up until this point, this paper has accepted the premise that Russia’s new 
criminal code is indeed comprised of great laws. However, it is worth considering 
the possibility that the problems, which Russia’s criminal justice has faced since the 
fall of the Soviet Union, might actually be the product of bad laws rather than bad 
implementation. According to one account, “the Russian criminal code is so 
oppressive and pervasive that ‘one must virtually retire to hermitage in order to 
avoid committing a crime.”69 Thus, perhaps the problem might be explained by an 
overly large and complex set of laws that is simply impossible or difficult to 
implement effectively and consistently. Another interpretation of this is that the 
drawn out and controversial process that the new criminal code underwent in being 
adopted, during which proposed changes were sacrificed, watered down, and 
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compromised, produced an inconsistent and/or ambiguous set of laws that is at the 
roots of Russia’s implementation problems. Perhaps too, the bad implementation is 
simply coupled with bad laws, resulting in the troubled post-Soviet criminal justice 
regime, which Russian legal practitioners have defensively tried to minimize with 
the “good laws, bad implementation” phenomenon explored in this paper. 
Regardless, it seems clear that further work is required to achieve a truly just, 
democratic criminal justice system in Russia.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
There seems to be truth in the commentary provided by those I met during 
my short visit to Russia. In fact, the simple formulation “great laws, bad 
implementation” seems to be the perfect, succinct way to encapsulate the problems 
posed by Russia’s massive criminal justice overhaul in the post-Soviet years. Many 
of the reforms attempted to address the inadequacies and failings of the Soviet 
system, however, the success of such reforms has been questionable. While it is not 
fully clear what is at the root of this phenomenon of “bad implementation,” nor is it 
even clear that Russia necessarily has “great laws,” it is clear that Russia’s criminal 
justice transition is not yet complete. The Moscow based criminal defense attorney 
might have seemed to gloss over the extent of the issues in explaining Russia’s 
criminal justice system as a product of “great laws, but just bad implementation.” 
However, perhaps the hope conveyed in his willingness to moderate is one way in 
which Russia’s legal community continues to strive for a fair, just, and democratic 
criminal justice system.  
